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et al.: Recent Cases

Recent Cases
ATTORNEYS-GIVING LEGAL ADVICE BY LAYMEN AS CONTEMPT.
Murphy v. Townley"

Application was made to the Supreme Court of North Dakota to assume original jurisdiction in proceedings seeking to punish defendants for contempt of
court in what is termed the illegal practice of law. Defendants had been guilty of
giving legal advice without having obtained a certificate of admission to the bar.
There is a statute in the state making such acts a misdemeanor. An act of the
legislature specifically sets forth what acts shall be punishable as contempt, and
the offense herein complained of is not included. The court held that the acts charged
do not come within the inherent power of the courts to punish as contempt. When
the legislature specifically defines what acts shall constitute contempt of court,
such legislative act is deemed a limitation on the power of the court.
This case presents the question of whether or not it is within the inherent power
of the court to punish as contempt the giving of legal advice without having obtained
a certificate of admission to the bar, and whether this power, if any, is subject to

be reasonably regulated by statute.
2
The "practice of law" has been variously defined. In People ex rel. State Bar

Association v. People's Stock Yards State Bank,3 the court adopted, although not

finally, the following definition submitted by a committee of the American Bar
Association: "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law, according to the laws
and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service
by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of

such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill." That court
further says: "Perhaps the major portion of the actual practice of law under modern
conditions consists of the work of attorneys outside of any court and has nothing
to do with court proceedings." It appears from a study of the cases that practice
4
of law means not only court work, but any work requiring legal knowledge or skill.

1. 274 N. W. 857 (N. D. 1937).
2. Cain v. Merchant's Nat. Bank &Trust Co. of Fargo, 66 N. D. 746, 268 N.
W. 719 (1936); In re Duncan, 83 S. C. 186, 65 S. E. 210 (1909); Mo. REv. STAT.
(1929) § 11692, defining "practice of law" and "law business." See also N. C. CODE
ANN. (1935) § 199, defining "practice of law" and making it unlawful for any person or corporation not a member of the bar to practice law.
3. 334 Ill. 462, 176 N. E. 901 (1931).
4. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195 (1879); In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54
N. E. 646 (1899); People v. Peoples Stock Yards State Bank, 344 I11. 462, 176 N. E.
901 (1931); People v. Alfani, 227 N. Y. 334, 125 N. E. 671 (1919). But see Atlanta
Title and Trust Co. v. Boykin, 172 Ga. 437, 157 S. E. 455 (1931).
(56)
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The control of the bar is a matter within the inherent power of the court
controls the admission of members to the bar, and it seems, should likewise have
the inherent power to punish as contempt, the illegal practice of law by persons not
licensed to practice. The power to regulate the practice of law seems, in its exercise,
to be essentially judicial and not legislative. 6
The principal case, in holding that the unauthorized practice of law by one
not a member of the bar is not within the inherent power of the court to punish
7
as contempt, is in direct conflict with the weight of authority. The following language is representative as to the matter of jurisdiction: "Having inherent and
plenary power and original jurisdiction to decide who shall be admitted to practice
as attorneys in this state, this court also has all the power and jurisdiction necessary
to protect and enforce its rules and decisions in that respect. Having power to
determine who shall and who shall not practice law in the state, and to license
those who may act as attorneys and forbid others who do not measure up to the
standards or come within the provisions of its rules, it necessarily follows that this
court has the power to enforce its rules and decisions against offenders, even though
they have never been licensed by this court."8
In the last mentioned case the power of the court to entertain the original
proceedings was questioned because the constitution provided that the original jurisdiction of the supreme court should be limited to certain things and that it should
have appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. The court held that this provision
did not apply where the practice of law was concerned. Missouri agrees with the
majority that it is within the inherent power of the court to punish as contempt any
illegal or unauthorized practice of law. 9

5. In re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S. W. (2d) 672 (1933); Clark v. Austin,
101 S. W. (2d) 977 (Mo. 1937); In re Morse, 98 Vt 85, 126 Atl. 550 (1924). For
discussion of the court's regulation of the bar in Missouri, see Atwood, The Missouri
Rule as to Regulation of the Bar (1936) 1 Mo. L. REv. 237; Howard, Control of
Unauthorized Practice Before Administrative Tribunals in Missouri (1937) 2 Mo.
L. REV. 313.
6. In re Hagan, 295 Mo. 435, 245 S. W. 336 (1922); Clark v. Austin, 101
S. W. (2d) 977 (Mo. 1937); State ex rel. Wright, Atty. Gen. v. Barlow, 131 Neb.
294, 268 N. W. 95 (1936); In re Morse, 98 Vt. 85, 126 Atl. 550 (1924).
7. Bowles v. United States, 50 F. (2d) 848 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931), cert. denied,
284 U. S.648 (1931) (a disbarred attorney held guilty of contempt for representing
a client); People v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N. E. 901
354 Ill.
595, 188
(1931); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Motorists Ass'n of Ill.,
N. E. 827 (1933) (a corporation held in contempt of court for illegal practice of law
even though the legal work was done by a licensed attorney); Clark v. Austin, 101
S. W. (2d) 977 (Mo. 1937); Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n,
55 R. I. 122, 179 AtI. 139 (1935) (an act denounced by statute may be punished as
contempt of court, notwithstanding the offender may be punished under a criminal
statute); In re Morse, 98 Vt. 85, 126 Atl. 550 (1924).
8. People v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N. F

901 (1931).

9. Ex parte Creasy, 243 Mo. 679, 148 S.W. 914 (1912); State ex rel. Selleck
v. Reynolds, 252 Mo. 369, 158 S.W. 671 (1913); Clark v. Austin, 101 S.W. (2d)
977 (1937).
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As to whether this inherent power in the court is subject to reasonable regulation by statute, the Missouri Supreme Court has not been entirely consistent.' 0
The better view and modem tendency has been that the court is not subject to such
regulation. In the case of In re Hagan4,the Missouri Supreme Court said: "In the
matter of contempt we have never gone further than to rule that as a matter of
comity between the separate departments of the state government we would recognize reasonable restriction imposed by the legislature. We have never ruled
that we had to recognize such legislative restrictions." Likewise, in the majority
of jurisdictions, the fact that the offense is punishable under criminal statutes will
not interfere with the courts power to punish the same acts as contempt of court.'2
It seems that the instant case is contrary to the general rule that the courts
have original jurisdiction in all matters pertaining to the practice of law and the
inherent power to punish violations of its rules.
DAvID R. HARDY
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-REGULATION THROUGH FEDERAL TAXATION.

Sonzinsky v. United States'
Defendant was convicted of dealing in firearms without the license required
by the National Firearms Act of 1934.2 The license fee imposed amounted to two
hundred dollars, and defendant contends that Congress exceeded its authority in
passing this act, because it was not a tax but regulatory and to a greater extent than
Congress was constitutionally capable of. Defendant also cites other parts of the
act imposing a two hundred dollar tax upon the transfer of firearms contending that
this also illustrates that the measure is regulatory rather than a tax measure. The

10. Ex parte Creasy, 243 Mo. 679, 148 S. W. 914 (1912); State ex rel. Selleck
v. Reynolds, 252 Mo. 369, 158 S. W. 671 (1913); In re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63
S. W. (2d) 672 (1933), indicate that the power to punish for contempt is inherent
in the court, but this power is subject to reasonable regulation by statute. But in
Clark v. Austin, 101 S. W. (2d) 977, 984 (Mo. 1937), Judge Frank in his opinion
says that its inherent power to punish for contempt cannot be reasonably regulated
by statute because it runs counter to the positive mandate of the constitution which
provides that no person or collection of persons, charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to one department of the government, shall exercise any power
properly belonging to either of the others.
11. 295 Mo. 435, 442, 245 S. W. 336, 337 (1922).
12. In People v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N. E. 901
(1931), where there was a statute imposing a penalty for the violation of it, the
court said: "The Legislature has not attempted to tie the hands of the courts in
dealing with contempts of this kind, and any attempt to do so would be an infringement upon the inherent exclusive jurisdiction of the courts."; People ex rel. Courtney
v. Ass'n of Real Estate Tax Payers, 354 Ill. 102, 187 N. E. 823 (1933); Rhode
Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, 55 R. I. 122,179 At. 139 (1935), cited
in note 7, supra. Contra: In re Frederick Bugasch, 12 N. J. Misc. 788, 175 At. 110
(1934).
1. 57 Sup. Ct. 554 (1937).
2. 48 STAT. 1236 (1934), 31 U. S. C. A. § 725 (1936).
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Court held the measure, as far as license tax was concerned, to be constitutional,
not committing itself on the rest of the act. The Court said that Congress could
choose its subject of taxation; that here there were no regulatory provisions enabling
the Court to call the act regulatory; that though there were some regulatory effects
that was true of every tax measure; and that so long as a measure was a tax on its
face the Court would not inquire into the motives of Congress despite the fact that
the act tended to suppress and burden the subject of the measure. Since it did not
effect an offensive regulation and since it operated as a tax netting some income, the
Court considered the act within the taxing power.
The Supreme Court in a number of cases has classified purported tax measures
of Congress into three categories. The first is the situation in which Congress has
passed an act taxing some conduct or article with the obvious purpose of regulation
or even suppression as distinguished from an attempt to obtain revenue. In Veazie
Bank v. Fenno,3 the Court upheld a tax upon the bank notes of state banks,
obviously for the purpose of destroying the issue of banknotes of the kind taxed,
because they were a source of unsoundness in the national finances. The Court sustained the act as a tax measure and also on the ground that Congress had authority
to regulate currency. 4 In the Head Money Cases5 an act of Congress was involved
which imposed a tax upon ship owners of fifty cents per foreign passenger which
they brought across. The Court upheld this measure because Congress has authority
to regulate immigration. 6 The laying of tariffs upon imports may be justified as a
7
regulation of foreign commerce over which Congress has control. Congress may also
rely upon its taxing power here.
The Court upheld these so-called taxes, but not so much on the ground that
Congress could levy such taxes under the tax power invested in Congress by the Constitution as on the ground that Congress had the power to regulate these activities
under regulatory provisions in the Constitution. The assessing of a tax was considered a legitimate method of regulating what Congress could regulate if possibly
8
Congress could not pass such acts under the tax powers.
In a second classification are the cases in which Congress has passed a tax
measure, again with an obvious purpose of regulation, however, taxing subjects not
subject to federal regulation. In In re Kollockg and McCray v. United States'
Congress had laid a tax on butter-colored oleomargarine, in the second case so high
that the effect would be to suppress that activity. It was contended that since suppression would be the effect, no revenue could be expected, illustrating that the
intent of Congress was not to acquire revenue but to effect regulation. The Court

3. 75 U. S.533 (1869).
4. U. S. CONST. ART. I, § 8.
5. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U. S. 580 (1884).
6. U. S. CONsT. ART. I, § 8.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. 165 U. S. 526 (1897).
10. 195 U. S. 27 (1904).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol3/iss1/15
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said that the act was on its face a revenue measure and upheld the act. In United
States v. Doremus,"t the Court considered an act of Congress placing a one dollar
license tax upon dealers in- narcotic drugs. That was the only revenue feature. The
act required dealers to record sales, permitting only physicians licensed and registered
to deal in the drugs. The records were to be kept easily accessible to federal investigation. The Court again upheld that act as a tax, explaining the apparent regulatory
provisions as methods of facilitating collection of the tax. In the first of these taxes
on opium it was found to cost the government more than the revenue derived.
However, by the time the Nigro case was decided which approved the Doremus
case, the tax had been raised.1 2 A statute passed by Congress levying a destructive
tax on manufacturers of certain kinds of matches deleterious to the health of the
3
employees engaged in the manufacture has never been contested in the courts."
The same is true of a tax levied upon contracts concerning cotton futures, the
purpose of the act obviously being suppression of gambling in the cotton market."
Again a tax on manufacture, sale and transportation of opium, the purpose of the
tax being suppression of such dealings, has not been called in question.' 5 The
cases in this group have been upheld on the ground that Congress has power to tax
the subject in question, and that since on the face, the acts were revenue measures
the Court could not look behind to the motives of Congress or ascribe to Congress
an intent which was not expressly placed in the measure, and that though there
would result incidental regulation, that was of no matter.
Thus in the first group of cases, a tax was justified as a method of legitimate
regulation whereas in the second group an actual regulation is justified as a tax
measure.
The third class are the cases in which Congress had assessed a tax measure
again with an obvious purpose of regulation or suppression of the subjects of taxation
but again not constitutionally liable to federal regulation. But in these cases the
Court invalidated the acts. The child labor cases are among the more famous of
these. In Hammer v. Dagenkart,'8 the Court invalidated the attempt to suppress
child labor under the interstate commerce clause. This case did not involve the tax
problem. In Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.," the Court declared unconstitutional
the tax placed upon all manufacturers knowingly using child labor irrespective of
the number used. The Court called this a penalty rather than a tax and pointed out
that the Secretary of Labor was also involved in the collection of the tax indicating

249 U. S. 86 (1919).
Nigro v. United States, 276 U. S. 332 (1928).
37 STAT. 81 (1912), 26 U. S. C. A. § 661 (1928).
39 STAT. 476 (1916), 26 U. S. C. A. § 731 (1928).
26 STAT. 620 (1890), repealed in 1914 and replaced by a similar provision
increasing the tax to $300. 38 STAT. 277 (1914), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1057 (1928).
16. 247 U. S. 251 (1918).
17. 259 U. S. 20 (1922).
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
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that revenue was not the end aimed at. In Hill v. Wallace,'8 the Court held unconstitutional a tax on contracts concerning grain futures as an attempt to regulate
beyond federal power under the guise of the tax powers. The case of United States v.

Butler, Receivers of Hoosac Mills Corp.,19 involved a tax on processors of certain
farm products, the revenue to be used for expenses incurred in the contracts made
by the federal government with farmers to decrease production. The Court declared
the tax a mere disguise for regulating prices in farm products. The Court rejected
the contention of the government that the general welfare clause permitted such

a regulation, saying that the matter was intrastate and therefore beyond the constitutional control of Congress. In the recent case of Carterv. Carter Coal Co., 20 an
act of Congress was involved declaring the coal industry to be affected with the
public interest and also one involving interstate commerce. It prescribed certain
codes, fixing prices, wages, hours, and working conditions. A tax was levied on all
coal producers but it was provided that something in the nature of a rebate on this
would be allowed should the industry consent to the imposition of the code. The tax
without the rebate was so high as to make the sale unprofitable unless the benefits
of the rebate were acquired. The Court said, besides the part that this was a regulation of intrastate matter beyond the scope of federal power, that the act could
not be justified as a tax measure, it being not a revenue measure but on its face a
penalty and an attempt to regulate that which Congress could not under regulatory
power reach. In United States v. Constantine,2 1 an act of Congress was declared
unconstitutional which in addition to the twenty-five dollar excise tax placed on
liquor retailers also imposed a tax of one thousand dollars when their operation was
contrary to the law of the locality in which they were carrying on business. The
act also provided a fine and imprisonment for failure to pay. The Court said that
this was an attempt to penalize and regulate under the guise of the taxing power. It
is thus seen that in this situation the Court has, unlike in the second situation,
peered behind the statute and discerned what was actually intended to be the
purpose of Congress in passing the statutes. The Court has done what it refused
to do in the oleomargarine and drug cases.
The principal case is one that may be placed in the second classification. Congress had through its taxing power sought to suppress the transactions in firearms
and the Court shut its eyes to the real purpose, calling the measure one for revenue
and allowed the act to stand. To actually distinguish the facts of many of the
cases sufficiently to justify the opposite views of the decisions in cases like the child
labor case and the oleomargarine case is difficult. The Court in the principal case
dropped a hint at the real distinction. The decision closes with the words that since
the act did not effect an offensive regulation and since it operated as a tax, netting

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

259 U.
297 U.
298 U.
296 U.
United

S. 44 (1922).
S. 1 (1936).
S. 238 (1936).
S. 287 (1935).
States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936).
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some income, the Court could consider it as a tax measure. It seems from many of
the cases that the Court is deciding the case on the question whether the regulation
is offensive rather than the basis given in the decisions.
There are three further cases which might be classed under the first head because
the tax was upheld largely on the ground that Congress could levy such a tax with
the desired regulation in view, but they also partake of some of the characteristics of
the second head in that the tax was upheld as such. The cases are also important in
connection with a consideration of the A.A.A. case and the Carter Coad23 case in
that they involve the rebating or crediting provisions found there. Of the three,
the case of Steward Machine Company v. Davis2 4 is the most important. Here
the act of Congress was involved which levied a tax upon all employers of eight
or more employees, the purpose being an insurance for the unemployed. The measure contained a provision for crediting employees up to ninety percent if the state
in which they resided enacted such an unemployment law. Such state law had to be
approved by a federal board, the funds collected thereunder had to be deposited
with the federal treasury, and funds were to be paid out at the state's request to
federally approved state agencies. Justice Cardozo, writing the opinion, said that
though the act was passed for some collateral good, 25 that that would not invalidate
the act, citing the Sonzinrky case. The credit provision was not considered to be
an attempt by Congress to force the states to enact laws and thereby effect a regulation in intra-state affairs, because the act did not require any state action, but
merely made provision so that an employer would not be doubly taxed. The Court
also cited the great extent of the unemployment problem, its national character,
and the state's frequent inability to cope with it individually, therefore deducing that
the problem was one for the federal government to assist with. The Court pointed
out that it was not holding that Congress could pass an act, unrelated to matters
legitimately within federal control, from which the state could only escape by
complying with the federal suggestion, indicating again that the tax and problem
were national. The Court also said that the various requirements which the state
acts had to meet were not invasions of the states rights because the state could
avoid them by just not passing any legislation along this line. The four dissenting
justices felt that the aim was intra-state and that the federal government had by the
method of the credit attempted to coerce the state into regulation of that strictly
state problem. The second case2 6 involving a state act passed in view of the federal
act, went on the same grounds as far as the immediate considerations are concerned. The third case 27 involved the tax on employers for the purpose of paying

23. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936).
24. Steward Machine Company v. Davis, 57 Sup. Ct. 883 (1937).
25. Justice Cardozo seemed to indicate that even if the act had been passed
to encourage states to comply, that would not be a ground for objection.
26. Charmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 57 Sup. Ct. 868 (1937).
27. Helvering, Com'r of Internal Revenue v. Davis, 57 Sup. Ct. 904 (1937).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1938
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old age pensions. Justice Cardozo again cited the national scope of the problem
and therefrom deduced the federal government's power to exercise control over the
situation.
PAUL F. NEDNER
CRIMINAL LAw-PETTY OFFENSES-RIGHT TO JuRY TRIAL.

District of Columbia v. Clawans'
Defendant was engaged in the business of dealer in return portions of railroad
tickets. An act of Congress required a $50 license tax to be paid by persons
engaged in that business and failure to pay the fee subjected the violator to a $300
fine or a ninety-day jail sentence. Defendant failed to pay the tax, was tried in
the police court, and fined $300. The trial was had without a jury under the act
of Congress which provided that in prosecutions in the District of Columbia police
court, when the accused was not under the Constitution entitled to trial by jury, he
should be tried without a jury except in cases in which the punishment might be
more than a $300 fine or a ninety-day jail sentence. The accused demanded a jury
trial but this was refused. He contended that Article III and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guaranteed him a jury trial. The Court
held that a jury trial was not essential in this case, saying that it had been the
practice to try certain petty offenses without a jury. The Court first discussed the
moral turpitude of the offense and its indictability at common law, concluding that
the offense was relatively inoffensive and not a crime at common law. The Court
discussed the severity of the punishment, indicating that this should here determine
the necessity of a jury. The Court cited numerous incidents of confinement some
as great as six months without a jury trial in England and also in the state courts.
The conclusion reached was that the punishment was not so severe as to require
a jury trial. Butler, J., dissenting, believed that the punishment was so great as to
make a jury trial necessary.
The two provisions in the Constitution of the United States concerning jury
trial seem from their wording to apply to every crime, making no exception of petty
offenses.2 These must be read, however, in the light of their historical background. In the reign of Henry VIII a movement began which dispensed with jury
trial in certain petty offenses in which the punishment and the moral turpitude
involved were small. The situation was made worse by the difficulty of obtaining
an appeal in cases tried by magistrates. The tendency grew, largely under legislation,
until some offenses which involved as great as seven years' transportation were triable
without a jury.3 Much of the reason for this was the cumbersomeness of the jury.
1. 57 Sup. Ct. 6, 60 (1937).
2. U. S. CONsT. ART. III, § 2: "The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury. . . ." U. S. CONST. AMENDMENT VI: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an im-

partial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed. . 3. "See 22 & 23 Car. II, c. 7 (1671).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol3/iss1/15
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The efficiency of summary trials was a necessity in England where criminal offenses
were clogging the dockets. The cases accordingly illustrate a tendency to justify
the summary trial on the basis of necessity rather than on the nature of the offense.
The colonists brought with them this concept of dispensing with jury trial but their
tendency was to limit the summary trial to a great extent. This was but natural
in view of the fact that the necessity for a quick disposal of cases in order to clear
the dockets was not so great in the sparsely settled colonies. The authors of our
Constitution had this background in mind, and taking it together with a view
of the proceedings in the constitutional convention, it is by no means an illogical
inference that the bald constitutional provisions nevertheless contemplated certain
4
cases in which jury trial was not necessary.
There are several other cases in which the Supreme Court has recognized this
5
qualification to the constitutional provisions. In Schick v. United States, a jury
was waived in the trial of an offense punishable by fine of $50 involving violation of
a law regulating the sale of oleomargarine. The Court held that the offense was
of such petty nature that a jury was not necessary, the Court considering the
punishment as indicative of the nature of the offense. The Court said that the
nature of the offense in addition to the penalty was the basis in the determination.
There are two Supreme Court cases that seem to contradict the Schick case somewhat. Callan v. Wilson,6 involving prosecutions for conspiracy in boycotting, the
fine for which was $25, and District of Columbia v. Colts,7 involving a thirty-day
jail sentence for reckless driving, both held that a jury was requisite. In each of
these cases the Court discussed the fact that the offenses were common law offenses
and pointed out the seriousness of conspiracy and reckless driving and their great
potential dangers rather than the extent of penalty. The Colts case distinguished the
Schick case by the fact that in the Schick case the offense was but a statutory violation, no offense at common law and not intrinsically so dangerous nor serious. From
these cases it is apparent that the test of determining whether a jury was necessary
was the seriousness of the offense; in the Schick case the punishment was greater
than in the Callan case and in the Colts case the nature of the offense was discussed,
largely ignoring the extent of the penalty. In the principal case the common law
nature of the offense was considered, but the severity of the punishment was clearly
the basis for the decision. In the trial court it was said that the nature of the
offense was no basis for determining the necessity of a jury trial.8 The principal
case reversed the trial court but the point on which the reversal came was that the
Supreme Court did not consider the punishment so severe as to require a jury
trial while the trial court did. This is a different attitude from the earlier cases;

4. Frankfurter and Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional
Guaranty of Trial by Jury (1926) 39 HARV. L. REv. 917, 968.
5. 195 U. S. 65 (1904).
6. 127 U. S. 540 (1888).
7. 282 U. S.63 (1930).
8. Clawans v. Dist. of Columbia, 84 F. (2d) 265 (App. D. C. 1936).
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there is a different basis for determination announced. Of course, to the extent
that the nature of the offense usually determines the severity of punishment the
two tests amount to the same thing, but there are situations where the different
considerations will produce different results.
The constitution of Missouri provides that the accused shall have the right
to a speedy, public trial by an impartial jury of the county.9 Some such provision
is present in nearly every state constitution. The Missouri constitution is general and
comprehensive in its language. That it contemplated qualifications to the requirement of a jury in every criminal case is as true as in the case of the United States
Constitution. It is considered more in the nature of preserving a right than creating
one.10 There are a number of statutes pertaining to justice of the peace courts
which permit a trial with a jury of six if this be demanded." The constitution
contemplates a jury of twelve and a lesser number cannot constitute a jury in the
constitutional sense.12 These courts are given jurisdiction over misdemeanors and
ordinance violations. 13 It might seem from the face of these statutes that a jury
could be refused in misdemeanor cases, but that possibility is small. There are no
cases construing these statutes in such way and the Supreme Court of the United
States has never permitted the denial of a jury to go that far.
There are a number of cases illustrating when the jury need not be granted. In
Delaney v. Police Court,14 a case involving drunkenness on the streets declared

by ordinance to be a misdemeanor triable in a police court without a jury, the court
said, "Neither the constitution of Missouri nor the constitution of the United States
guarantees to a person charged with a violation of a mere municipal police regulation the right of a trial by jury." In the early case of State v. Ledford 5 the
court upheld an act declaring assaults, batteries, affrays, riots, routs, and unlawful
assemblies not to be indictable but punishable before a justice of the peace in a
summary way. In Ex parte Kiburg'1 6 the defendant was tried in a police court for
selling lottery tickets, forbidden by ordinance, and refused a jury. He was convicted
and fined, and refusing to pay, was jailed. The court said that in trial of a petty
offense cognizable in police courts, a defendant was not entitled to a jury. The
waiver of a trial jury is quite another thing from the denial thereof. A jury may be

9. Mo. CONsT. art. II, § 22.
10. Barnard & Lease Mfg. Co. v. Monett Milling Co., 79 Mo. App. 153 (1889).
11. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 6666 conferring upon municipal judges jurisdiction over ordinance violations gives the accused the righgt to a jury as in justice of
the peace courts which by § 3436 is a jury of six. That is in the case of second class
cities and the same is true of third class cities by § 6763 and of fourth class cities
by § 6891. As to cities of the first class § 6163 omits the jury requirement but is
very clear in allowing an appeal. The justice of the peace courts are given jurisdiction over misdemeanors by § 3414.
12. State v. Hamey, 168 Mo. 167, 67 S. W. 620 (1902).
13. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 3414.
14. 167 Mo. 667, 67 S. W. 589 (1902).
15. 3 Mo. 102 (1832).
16. 10 Mo. App. 442 (1881).
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waived even in a felony case under the rulings of the United States Supreme Court
7
although the same is not true in Missouri.'
Upon viewing these cases it is apparent that in Missouri there are certain petty
offenses which may be tried without a jury and it seems probable that Missouri
goes as far as the United States Supreme Court in permitting this.
PAUL F. NIEDNER

EXECUTORS

AND ADMINISTRATORS-EXHIBITION FOR CLASSIFICATION.

Schaefer v. Magel's Estate'

Within six months after first letters were granted in decedents estate, the
plaintiff filed a claim in probate court for services rendered. Plaintiff exhibited his
demand for allowance to the administratrix before the duration of that period but
made no exhibition for classification. The administratrix endeavored to defeat
allowance by maintaining that the exhibition for classification was necessary before
the court could take jurisdiction of the subject-matter. The probate court as well
as the circuit court in St. Louis agreed with this contention. The St. Louis Court
of Appeals held that although the demand for allowance to both the probate court
and the administrator is jurisdictional, the exhibition for classification is not.
The Missouri statutes relating to the exhibition, presentment, and allowance
of demands against the estates of decedents have been interpreted by the Supreme
Court of Missouri in State ex rel. Dean v. Daues°" and Home Insurance Co. v. Wick-

ham.3 As therein construed the statutes provide for two written exhibitions of a
demand to the executor or administrator within a year after the first granting of
letters. Apparently the same document properly worded may supply the requirements of presentation for both allowance and classification.4 1. The claimant "may"

17. Cases in which Missouri has permitted waivers in trials for misdemeanors:
State v. Larger, 45 Mo. 510 (1870); St. Charles v. Hackman, 133 Mo. 634, 34 S. W.

878 (1896); State v. Bockstruck, 136 Mo. 335, 38 S. W. 317 (1896). Cases in which
Missouri has refused to permit the waiver of a jury in trial of a felony: State v.
Talken, 316 Mo. 596, 292 S. W. 32 (1927); Neales v. State, 10 Mo. 498 (1847);
Cousineau v. State, 10 Mo. 501 (1847). Case in which United States Supreme Court
has permitted waiver in felony trial: Patton v. U. S., 281 U. S. 276 (1930).
1. 108 S. W. (2d) 608 (Mo. App. 1937).
2. 321 Mo. 1126, 14 S. W. (2d) 990 (1928).
3. 281 Mo. 300, 219 S.W. 961 (1920).
4. The notice given the administrator under the statute [Mo. REv. STAT.
(1929) § 186], in regard to exhibition for classification, often is broad enough to

include that which is required under the statute. [Mo. REv. STAT. (1929)

§ 1871,

in regard to exhibition for allowance in which case no further notice to the administrator is necessary; but if it does not state that the claimant will present the claim

for allowance at the next regular or adjourned term of court, then it only has the
effect of a notice in the first sense which preserves his right to classification under
the statute classifying demands [Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 182], and brings it within
the one year statutory limitation [Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 183]. See Van Wagner

v. Slane, 14 S. W. (2d) 710 (1929).
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request classification 5 which is thus deemed permissive rather than mandatory. 6
2. In order that the probate court get jurisdiction of the subject-matter, an
essential element is that the claimant make a claim to the administrator for the
allowance of a demand. 7 This is necessary so that the administrator may be apprised of the amount of the claim and its origin; he will thus be able to investigate
it intelligently and prevent any further recovery on the same cause."
In addition to the claim for allowance which must be presented to the executor
or administrator, the claimant must present a demand for allowance to the probate
court within the same year after the granting of letters in order that that court have
jurisdiction over the subject-matter. 9 These two requirements for jurisdiction existed
side by side after 1855 and always have been held to serve two distinct purposes.1 0
The Missouri statute" in regard to classification of demands presented
against a decedent's estate includes four definitely specified types of preferred
demands, the proper classification of which depends upon the character and identity
of the same. The fifth class includes all demands without regard to quality which
shall be "legally exhibited" against the estate within six months after the date of
granting first letters. The sixth class includes all demands "thus exhibited" after
the end of six months and within one year after the granting of first letters on the
estate.
Unless demands of the first, second, third, and fourth classes are exhibited
within the first six months after the grant of letters, they lose their priority and
fall into the sixth class.1 2 All demands except those of the first, second, third, and
fourth classes that are exhibited within the first six months fall into the fifth class;
if exhibited within the second six months they fall into the sixth class. None of the
demands mentioned in the first, second, third, and fourth classes can in any case be
assigned to the fifth class, for if they are exhibited within the first six months, they
must be classified as the statute requires, and if not exhibited within the first six
months they descend in the order of classification to the sixth class.
In order to appreciate the significance of the exhibition for classification it must
be clearly distinguished from the actual classification by the probate court. The
Missouri statute 3 relating to the exhibition for classification does not require
presentation to the probate court for the obvious reason that when there is any ques-

5. The notice should be in writing, embrace all the items in the claim, and
designate an intention to present same to the court for allowance. Pfeiffer v. Suss,
73 Mo. 245 (1880).

6. Mo.

REv. STAT.

(1929) § 186.

7. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929 §§ 187, 195, 196, 197.
8. Britian v. Fender, 116 Mo. App. 93, 92 S. W. 179 (1906).

9. Mo.

REv. STAT.

(1929) § 187.

10. Keys v. Keys' Estate, 217 Mo. 48, 116 S. W. 537 (1909); Home Ins. Co. v.
Wickham, 281 Mo. 300, 219 S. W. 961 (1920); Price v. McCause, 30 Mo. App. 627
(1888); Savings Bank v. Burgin, 73 Mo. App. 108, 114 (1898).
11. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 182. See the instant case.
12. See Walley v. Gentry, 68 Mo. App. 298 (1897).

13.

Mo.

REV. STAT.

(1929) § 187.
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tion about the classification of a claim the claimant will try to get his claim classified
by the probate court in the most advantageous manner possible, and thus is bound
to present a petition of this sort.14 The demand may be established by the order of
the probate court or on appeal from such judgment.'- It is then classified in accordance with the statutory requirements.16 The claim may be established by the judgment of some other court'- and in this case the judgment may be presented to the
probate court and classified without notice to the administrator.'" Where there is
no contest before the court upon the question of the class to which the claim
belongs, there is nothing for the court to do but classify the claim as the law directs.1 9
In the allowance and classification of claims against estates the Missouri probate
courts are upon the same footing as courts of general jurisdiction.2"
The exhibition for classification is in no sense the beginning of a legal proceeding based on a demand but is only an exhibition for classification of the claim if and
when allowed. For any effective purpose it must be made within the first six months
in a situation where the demand for allowance is not made until after the first six
months but within the first year after the granting of letters. 2' If a claim
falling within one of the first five classes is exhibited for classification in conformance with the statute22 within the first six months but is not presented to the
court for allowance until the second six months it should be assigned to one of the
first five classes rather than to the sixth.23 The exhibition for classification is unnecessary in regard to claims of the sixth class.
The exhibition for classification may vitally affect the payment of the claimants demand since the statutory provision 24 requires that "all demands against
any estate shall be paid by the executor or administrator, as far as he has assets,
in the order in which they are classed; and no demand of one class shall be paid
until all previous classes shall be satisfied." This is apparent in a case of an insolvent
estate where only certain classes of claims first in the order of priority can be covered by the available assets.
The legislature has provided two slightly repetitious statutes which cover
the exhibition for classification and the exhibition for allowance to the administrator

14. Cooper v. Duncan, 20 Mo. App. 355 (1886).
15. Langston v. Canterbury, 173 Mo. 122, 73 S. W. 151 (1903).
16. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 182.
17. Stephens v. Bernays, 119 Mo. 143, 24 S. W. 46 (1893).
18. Gewe v. Hanszen, 85 Mo. App. 136 (1900).
19. In re Kellam's Estate, 227 Mo. App. 291, 53 S. W. (2d) 401 (1932).
20. Johnson v. Beazley, 65 Mo. 250 (1887); Smith v. Simms, 77 Mo. 269, 272
(1883); Henry v. McKerlie, 78 Mo. 416 (1883).
21. See the instant case.
22. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 186, providing for exhibition for classification
should probably be construed in relation to the words "legally exhibited" in class
five and "thus exhibited" in class six of Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 182.
23. Knisely v. Leathe, 256 Mo. 341, 166 S. W. 257 (1913); Walley v. Gentry,
68 Mo. App. 298 (1896); Telephone Co. v. Hamil, 160 Mo. App. 521 (1911).
24. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 208.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1938
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or executor. 25 There is no practical reason for the exhibition for classification. The
exhibition of the demand for allowance gives the administrator or executor ample
notice of the extent of the claim and there is no reason why the demand for allowance could not be presented to the administrator or executor at the time when he
is able to make an exhibition for classification. 2G By repealing the superfluous
exhibition for classification the legislature would remove red-tape from probate
procedure and the presentment of claims against estates would be facilitated. Cases
27
such as the instant case would be avoided.
LIPMAN GOLDMAN FELD
FRAUD AND DECEIT-PRoMISSORY STATEMENTS-PRESENT INTENT

NOT

TO PERFORM.

Jeck v. O'Meara"
Action for damages for alleged fraud and deceit. The defendant was zone
manager for the Chevrolet Motor Co. The plaintiff alleged that defendant, for the
purpose of inducing plaintiff to invest $15,000 in the capital stock of the Lindell
Chevrolet Co., fraudulently and falsely represented, inter alia: that plaintiff could
not lose any money that he invested because the General Motors Holding Company
existed for the purpose of taking over failing dealers, and said Holding Company
would come to the rescue of any retail dealer in financial trouble and the investors
would not lose a dime; and that plaintiff could not lose any money that he might
invest in the Lindell Chevrolet Company because the Holding Company had never
permitted a licensed dealer to fail in business, or the investors therein to lose their
investment. Plaintiff further alleged that defendants made the statements as of
their own knowledge, when in fact they did not know whether said statements
were true or not; that the representations related to matters peculiarly within the
knowledge of the defendants; that defendants in making the representations misstated an existing state of mind. The defendants filed a joint demurrer. The
demurrer was overruled, and defendants answered by general denial. Judgment
for plaintiff in the lower court, but on appeal the judgment was reversed, and cause
remanded. The court said that the statements of defendants were promissory, and
too extravagant to be believed; and even when coupled with the allegation that
such statements were peculiarly within the knowledge of defendants, were not sufficient to state a cause of action.

25. Knisely v. Leathe, 256 Mo. 341, 166 S. W. 257 (1913).
26. Pfeiffer v. Suss, 73 Mo. 245 (1880), shows that the exhibition for classification must be practically as complete as the demand for allowance and thus there
can be no pretense that an early exhibition for classification enables the claimant
to have more time to prepare his case.
27. It should be noted that Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 186 makes no mention
of the term "classification" which causes some confusion in the interpretation of the
statute. The exhibition for classification may be easily avoided if the administrator
is persuaded to waive it when the demand for allowance is presented to him.
1. Jeck v. O'Meara, 107 S. W. (2d) 782 (Mo. 1937).
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By the great weight of authority, 2 fraud must relate to a present or pre-existing
fact, and cannot be based on a prediction or promise as to the future course of
events.3
Promises going to the future are not statements of fact on which deceit
can be based. The law distinguishes between a representation of existing facts and
a representation of facts to come into existence4 A statement as to future events
cannot very well be false at the time it is made. In the absence of special circumstances courts regard these promissory statements as mere opinion or hope.
But if, coupled with a promissory statement, there is the further allegation that
the promisor had no intention of performing, a type of situation is presented on which
the courts are not agreed. The majority of courts gets around the general rule as
to promissory statements by holding that one's state of mind is a present fact,
arid, therefore, a misrepresentation upon which fraud may be predicated.5 "The
state of a man's mind at a given time is as much a fact as is the state of his digestion." 6 Missouri, however, holds that fraud cannot be predicated on a promissory
statement, even though at the time of making the promise there was an intention
7
not to perform.
In the principal case the court bases its decision on the earlier Missouri decision in Reed v. Cooke,- and says that it can see no difference in principle between
the conclusion in the case under discussion and the conclusion reached there. Prior
to the Reed case there were Missouri cases holding with the majority rule.9 The
Reed case was based on the earlier case of Younger v. Hoge,'0 in which the court
said, "A promise, though made without intention to fulfill, is not a misrepresentation
of an existing fact."" Gantt, J., in his dissenting opinion in the Reed case,12 very
ably disposes of the Younger case by showing that the cases cited in support of it
did not involve, as a basis of fraud, a promise made with no intent to perform.

2. (1927) 51 A. L. R. 49.
3. McFarland v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 125 Mo. 253, 28 S. W. 590 (1894); Estes v.
Desnoyers Shoe Co., 155 Mo. 577, 56 S. W. 316 (1900); Younger v. Hoge, 211 Mo.
444, 111 S. W. 20 (1908); Bank v. Hutton, 224 Mo. 42, 123 S. W. 47 (1909); Stonemets v. Head, 248 Mo. 243, 154 S. W. 108 (1913); Bryan v. L. & N. R. R., 292 Mo.
535, 238 S. W. 484 (1922); Edwards v. French, 304 Mo. 194, 263 S. W. 132 (1924);
Metropolitan Paving Co. v. Brown-Crummer Inv. Co., 309 Mo. 638, 274 S. W. 815
(1925); Collins v. Lindsay, 25 S. W. (2d) 84 (Mo. 1930); Grand Lodge v. Massachusetts B. & Ins. Co., 324 Mo. 938, 25 S. W. (2d) 783 (Mo. 1930).
4. Sawyer v. Prickett, 86 U. S. 146, 160 (1874).
5. (1927) 51 A. L. R. 63.
6. Swift v. Rounds, 19 R. I. 527, 531, 35 Ad. 45, 46 (1896).
7. (1927) 51 A. L. R. 73.
8. 331 Mo. 507, 55 S. W. (2d) 275 (1932).
9. Culbertson v. Young, 156 Mo. 261, 56 S. W. 893 (1900); Laswell v. National Handle Co., 147 Mo. App. 497, 126 S. W. 969 (1910); cf. Missouri Loan and
Inv. Co. v. Federal Trust Co., 175 Mo. App. 646, 158 S. W. 111 (1913).
10. Younger v. Hoge, 211 Mo. 444, 111 S. W. 20 (1908).
11. Ibid. at 445, 111 S. W. at 22.
12. Reed v. Cooke, 331 Mo. 507, 567, 55 S. W. (2d) 275, 279 (1932), cited
note 8, supra.
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There is another line of cases in Missouri which, while purporting to support
the Missouri rule, have produced a more liberal doctrine. In Metropolitan Paving
Co. v. Brown-Crummer Inv. Co.,13 the court subscribes to the Missouri rule, but
goes on to say that a state of mind may be misrepresented, and thus constitute a
misrepresentation of fact. There is still a later case, Collins v. Lindsay,14 in support
of this more liberal rule which states, "A state of mind, an existing purpose, may be
misrepresented and thus constitute a misrepresentation of fact."' 15 It will be noted,
however, that in the Metropolitan and Collins cases the fact situation differs somewhat from the other Missouri cases in point. In these two cases the purpose for which
the act of plaintiff is asked is misrepresented, whereas in the cases holding opposite
to them the misrepresentation has been as to future events solely, even though there
was a present intent not to perform. The narrow and confined exception found in
these last two cases will include so few cases as to make it useless; but even so, on
this slight difference in the cases the editors of the Anerican Law Reports have
attempted to reconcile the Missouri cases. 16 However, it seems like a distinction
without a difference, and it would be far better for the Missouri court to recognize
the fraudulent nature of a promise made with present intent not to perform than
to adhere to its present rule as to promissory statements. Furthermore, it is out of
line with the great majority of the cases in other jurisdictions.
JOHN HAMSHAW

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-RIGHTS OF CREDITORS TO LAND CONVEYED WITH INTENT
TO DEFRAUD THEM.
Castorinav. Herrmann'
Plaintiff obtained a judgment in the justice court against Joe and Caterina
Compise on December 4, 1929. On December 7, 1929, a deed dated November 26,
1929, was recorded which conveyed the property involved herein to Harry Roth, who
was acting as their attorney. On January 9, 1930, Roth executed a deed of trust and
note to defendant, describing the property in question, which was not recorded
by the defendant until November 20, 1930. On January 11, 1930, plaintiff filed a
transcript of the judgment previously obtained with the clerk of St. Louis county,
thereby obtaining a lien on all land in that county belonging to Joe and Caterina
Compise, as provided by statute.2 On May 13, 1930, after Roth conveyed by deed the

13. Metropolitan Paving Co. v. Brown-Crummer Inv. Co., 309 Mo. 638, 274
S.W. 815 (1925).
14. Collins v. Lindsay, 25 S. W. (2d) 84 (Mo. 1930).
15. Id. at 90.
16. (1927) 51 A. L. R. 73, cited note 7, supra: "While the Missouri court
has taken the view that fraud cannot be predicated on an unfulfilled promise, even
though at the time it was made there was an intention not to perform it, this doctrine
has been limited in its scope to promissory statements, and has been held not to
apply to a misrepresentation of intention or purpose, which the court has regarded
as a statement of fact."
1. 104 S. W. (2d) 297 (Mo. 1937).
2. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 1144.
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property to his wife's sister on March 21, 1930, plaintiff brought suit against Roth,
his grantee and the Compises, and obtained a judgment by which title was rein-

vested in the Compises.

Plaintiff levied upon the property on May 20, 1931, and,

upon sale under execution to satisfy the judgment on June 15, 1931, purchased the
property. Plaintiff then instituted the present suit in equity to have the deed of
trust to defendant set aside, as fraudulent, and in that way to clear the cloud on
his title. The defendant was not a party to the former suit, and there was nothing
then on record to show he had any interest in the land. The court found for the
defendant and entered a judgment dismissing plaintiff's petition, but during the
same term the court sustained plaintiff's motion for a new trial. Defendant appeals
from the order granting a new trial, which was based on the belief of the trial court
that the verdict was against the weight of evidence.
A judgment creditor in Missouri has two methods of satisfying his judgment
in case of a fraudulent conveyance. 3 He can disregard the conveyance as if it never
existed and levy upon the land. 4 At the sale of the property it is even permissible for
him to become the purchaser. 5 Then, in order to clear the cloud from the title that
the fraudulent conveyance has made, the purchaser may bring a bill in equity to set
aside and cancel the conveyance, thereby leaving his title clear and free from this
cloud. This procedure is allowed on the theory that, by the fraudulent conveyance,
no title passed out of the fraudulent grantor so the subsequent sale under execution
passes good title tq the purchaser. 6 This method of proceeding is objectionable because the purchaser at the sale is aware that he is buying a law suit and, for that
reason, he will not pay much for the property.
The better practice, and the one that is considered fairer by the courts to
all parties concerned, is for the judgment creditor first to set aside the conveyance,
after having obtained judgment and before execution upon the property, thus clearing
the title and preventing a possible sacrifice of the property on sale.7 Then after the
title is clear he may levy upon the property and sell it under execution.
No matter which of these two courses is taken, it is necessary to resort to equity
if the title is to be cleared. 8 Plaintiff in the principal case proceeded in a manner

3. Lallment v. Poupeny, 12 Mo. App. 580 (1874); see Dalton v. Barron, 293
Mo. 36, 239 S. W. 97 (1922), 22 A. L. R. 187 (1923).
4. Ryland v. Callison, 54 Mo. 513 (1874); see Dalton v. Barron, 293 Mo. 36,
239 S. W. 97 (1922); Bobb v. Woodward, 50 Mo. 95 (1872); Dunnica v. Coy, 28
Mo. 525 (1859); Herrington v. Herrington, 27 Mo. 560 (1858); Rankin v. Harper,
23 Mo. 579 (1856); Eddy v. Baldwin, 23 Mo. 588 (1856); Aspinall v. Jones, 17
Mo. 209 (1852); Howe and Wallace v. Waysman, 12 Mo. 169 (1848); Kinealy V.
Macklin, 2 Mo. App. 241 (1876).
5. Oldham v. Wade, 273 Mo. 231, 200 S. W. 1053 (1918).
6. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 3117, 3122; Woodard v. Mastin, 106 Mo. 324,
17 S. W. 308 (1891).
7. Welch v. Mann, 193 Mo. 304, 92 S. W. 98 (1906); Lionberger v. Baker,
88 Mo. 447 (1885); see Spindle v. Hyde, 247 Mo. 32, 152 S. W. 19 (1912).
8. Delo v. Johnson, 85 S. W. 109 (Mo. App. 1905); see Dalton v. Barron, 293
Mo. 36, 239 S. W. 97 (1922); Gill v. Newhouse, 178 S. W. 495 (Mo. 1915); George v.
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9
sanctioned by law, although not in the more approved manner. While the facts
do not show that plaintiff had any knowledge of the defendant's need of trust when
the first suit to set aside conveyances was instituted, he had constructive notice
before the levy by virtue of the recording of the instrument.
His suit brought against the defendant, to remove the cloud from his title, was
unsuccessful on the first hearing, but if on the new trial, which was ordered by the
trial court and the order sustained by the supreme court, the deed of trust should
be found to have been fraudulent and is set aside, then plaintiff's title will be clear
and free of this encumbrance. On the new trial, if it should be found that this deed
of trust was given in fraud of creditors, then plaintiff's levy and sale will at least
prove to have been proper, for the plaintiff's lien will date from the filing of the
judgment with the circuit clerk, even though the property was in the name of a
fraudulent grantee at that time.1°
CLIFFORD A. JONES

INSURANCE-INJURIES THROUGH EXTERNAL, VIOLENT AND AccmENTAL MEANS.

Gasperino v. Prudential Insurance Company of Americal
Action by beneficiary on an insurance policy on the life of her husband. The
policy carried a double indemnity clause which provides for the payment of an
additional sum of $1000 if the insured's death was "a result, directly and independently of all other causes, of bodily injuries, effected solely through external, violent and
accidental means, of which ... there is a visible contusion or wound on the exterior
of the body.., provided, however, that.., it shall not be payable if the death of
the Insured resulted . . . directly or indirectly from bodily or mental infirmity or
Insured drank water from the well in his back yard in
disease in any form ......
preference to water piped to his house by the city because it was cooler and more
refreshing during the hot days of summer. He developed the symptoms of typhoid
fever, whereupon the well water was examined and found to contain typhoid germs.
Within the time named in the policy, he died of typhoid fever. The court held for
the plaintiff.
The chief point in controversy is whether the death was the result of "external,
violent, and accidental means." The insured intended to drink the water but not
the germs, thus the drinking of the germs was an accident. When he accidentally
drank the germs there was caused thereby a bodily injury. The fatal fever followed

Williamson, 26 Mo. 190 (1858). Contra: Potter v. Adams, 125 Mo. 118, 28 S. W.
490 (1894); but see Chandler v. Bailey, 89 Mo. 641, 1 S. W. 745 (1886).
9. Slattery v. Jones, 96 Mo. 216, 8 S. W. 554 (1888).
10. Dalton v. Barron, 293 Mo. 36, 239 S. W. 97 (1922); Slattery v. Jones, 96
Mo. 216, 8 S. W. 554 (1888); Ryland v. Callison, 54 Mo. 513 (1874). On this
general subject see 12 R. C. L. 614; (1929) 64 A. L. R. 790, 794; also (1902) 2 COL.
L.REv. 421; (1908) 8 COL. L. REv. 582; (1914) 14 COL. L. REV. 385; (1890) 3
HARv. L. REV. 283; (1889) 12 HARv. L. REv. 283; (1924) 37 HARv. L. REv. 489;
(1924) 37 HAxv. L. Rnv. 500.

1. 107 S. W. (2d) 819 (Mo. App. 1937).
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as a natural result from such injury. The injury was external as the germs were
external and violent and came from the outside to infect insured under circumstances
which were accidental, and as a result the typhoid fever developed as incident to such
accident Cracked lips and swollen face formed the "visible contusion or wound," and
as the disease was the result of an accident it did not fall within the clause of the
policy excluding liability for death by disease.
The phrase "external, violent, and accidental means" is the point around which
the trouble centers in allowing recovery in a case like this. Each word taken separately would not seem to present any great difficulty although there are many cases
and discussions about each of them. There is a recognized distinction between accidental death and death by accidental means. 2 Accidental death is concerned only
with accidental results (unexpected and unusual consequences) of intended or
unintended means and causes. Death by accidental means requires that death or
injury must have resulted from acts, conduct, or circumstances which happened
by chance, not as expected, not intended, not foreseen.3 Accidental means are those
which produce effects which are not the natural and probable consequences of the
act.4 This is fundamentally the same as the foreseeability test in negligence which
has been advocated as a test of accidental means.5 The application of these tests, and
others not specifically mentioned, may be seen by a review of the cases. The insured, while chopping wood, was struck by a flying splinter and died from blood
poisoning caused thereby.6 Ptomaine poisoning from eating mushrooms in a restaurant,7 and by eating bad ice cream," typhoid fever from drinking polluted water,"
unintentionally inhaling gas,10 unintentional taking of poison," heat prostration,12 lanced pimple introducing germs causing fatal pneumonial 3 have all been
held to be "accidental means" of death.
As to the meaning of the words "external and violent" the cases are in apparent
harmony. The term is broadly interpreted to include accidents and deaths, the
cause of which would seem, at first blush, to be neither external nor violent, e. g. the

2.

(1936) 1 Mo. L. REv. 97; (1925) 9 MINN. L. REv 669.

3. Curry v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 221 Mo. App. 626, 287 S. W. 1053 (1926);
(1931) 8 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 682; (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REV. 762.
4. Wright v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 188 Mo. App.

457, 174 S. W. 833 (1915); (1925) 9 MINN. L. REv. 669.
5. (1935)84 U. of PA. L. REv. 257.

6. Griswold v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 107 Vt. 367, 180 Adt. 649 (1935).
7. United States Casualty Co. v. Griffis, 186 Ind. 126, 114 N. E. 83 (1916).
8. O'Connor v. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co., 208 Mo. App. 46, 232 S. W.
218 (1921).
9. Christ v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 231 111. App. 439 (1923), aff'd, 312
Ill. 525, 144 N. E. 161 (1924).
10. Paul v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 45 Hun. 313 (N. Y. 1887), aff'd, 20 N. E. 347
(1889).
11. McNally v. Maryland Casualty Co., 162 Wash. 321, 298 Pac. 721 (1931);
(1931) 16 MINN. L. REv. 109.
12. Layton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 89 S. W. (2d) 576 (Mo. App. 1936).
13. Cameron v. Massachusetts Protective Ass'n., 275 S. W. 988 (Mo. App.
1925).
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ptomaine poisoning case, 14 typhoid fever,' 5 heat prostration,"6 and pneumonia. 7
On the other hand an overdose of opium has been held not to be external and violent.,,
The same is true as to epileptic fits.19 In a New York case it was held that "external,
violent and accidental means" does not include death caused by the accidental taking
of poison, "since death was not caused by an external act, nor by anything acting
externally, and certainly not by any violent external means.' ' 2° There was a strong
dissent however.
It has been said that "external means" in an accident policy should be construed to mean that the means or that which caused the injury be external, and
not that the injury be external, the court saying that ".

.

. while the policy pro-

vides that the liability arises when the injury 'is through external, violent, and
accidental means, independently of all other causes,' it was not designed that
there should be such external violence, as a fall, a kick, or a blow, on the person,
as would cause death or an injury, before the liability of the company could arise.
This language was inserted in the contract to protect the company against hidden
or secret diseases, resulting in injury, where there was no manifestation of harm
to the external body.... It is universally understood, when it is said that one died

a violent death, that it was unnatural,-a death not occurring in the ordinary way;
...
and in using this word the insurance company was attempting to prevent the
assured from asserting a claim when the injury or death was the result of some
natural cause. .".."21 This view has been widely approved, 22 and could easily serve

14. Griswold v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 107 Vt. 367, 180 Atl. 649 (1935),
cited in note 6, supra.
15. O'Connor v. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co., 208 Mo. App. 46, 232 S. W.
218 (1921), cited in note 8, supra.
16. McNally v. Maryland Casualty Co., 162 Wash 321, 298 Pac. 721 (1931),
cited in note 11, supra.
17. Layton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 89 S. W. (2d) 576 (Mo. App. 1936),
cited in note 12, supra.
18. Bayless v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 2 Fed. Cas. No. 1138 (C. C. E. D. N. Y.
1877).
19. Tennant Adm'r. v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 31 Fed. 322, 326 (C. C. N. D. Cal.
1887).
20. Hill v. Hartford Accident Ins. Co., 22 Hun. 187, 189 (N. Y. 1880).
21. American Accident Co. v. Reigart, 94 Ky. 547, 23 S. W. 191 (1893).
22. Campbell v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y., 109 Ky. 661, 60 S. W. 492
(1901); Spring Garden Ins. Co. v. Imperial Tobacco Co., 132 Ky. 7, 116 S. W. 234
(1909); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bethel, 140 Ky. 609, 131 S. W. 523 (1910); General
Accident & Life Assurance Corp., Ltd. v. Meredith, 141 Ky. 92,132 S.W. 191 (1910);
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Martin, 163 Ky. 12, 173 S. W. 307 (1915); Continental Beneficial Ass'n v. Holt, 167 Ky. 806, 181 S. W. 648 (1916); General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Louisville Home Tel. Co., 175 Ky. 96, 193 S.
W. 1031 (1917); Woods v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 240 Ky. 398, 42 S. W.
(2d) 499 (1931); Republic Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Hatcher, 244 Ky. 574, 51 S.
W. (2d) 922 (1932); Federal Union Life Ins. Co. v. Richey's Adm'x, 256 Ky. 262,
75 S. W. (2d) 767 (1934); Dezell v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 176 Mo. 253, 75 S. W.
1102 (1903); Young v. Railway Mail Assn, 126 Mo. App. 325, 103 S. W. 557
(1907); Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. McAdoo, 57 S. W. 409 (Tenn. 1899).
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as a basis for the decision of the principal case. The insurance company was not
made liable for a hidden or secret disease, resulting in injury, and still the insured was
allowed recovery for death caused by the internal action of germs, which he could
reasonably expect to have been covered by his policy.
CHARLES M. WALKER

Boy
ELEC-

NEGLIGENCE-DuTY OF CARE-CAUSATION-INTEVENING CAUSE-LIABILITY TO
FLYING

KITE

FOR INJURIES WHEN KITE STRING CAME IN CONTACT WITH

TRIC WIRES.

Schneiter v. City of Chillicothe"
Plaintiff, a boy of nine, was flying a kite, and when the kite string came in
contact with the wires, the string being damp the current came through the string
and the plaintiff was burned and shocked. The wires were maintained by the defendant city. Plaintiff claims that they were maintained in a negligent manner in
that they were not properly insulated and were not strung high enough. The lot
on which the plaintiff was flying the kite was a common lot and he was in a place
where he had a right to be. Defendant was charged with knowledge that boys like
the plaintiff had been in the habit of flying kites on this lot.
The appellants case was attacked by the defendant city, on the grounds that
there was no duty owing to the boy from the city, that the defendant's act was not
the legal cause, and that there was such an intervening agency as to cut off the
defendant's liability if any existed.
As to the city's argument that there was no duty owing this plaintiff, it must
2
be realized that from the case of Heaven v. Pender it has been settled that when a
reasonable man can foresee a risk of some injury to the plantiff in the zone of danger,
of sufficient seriousness that a reasonable man would use care, a duty arises to use
the care of the ordinary reasonable man. Upon applying the facts of the case to this
accepted test it becomes apparent that there was a duty owing to the plaintiff and
members of his class. For the purpose of determining whether the actor should
recognize that his conduct involves a risk, he is assumed to know the qualities and
habits of human beings, the qualities, characteristics and capacities of things and
forces in so far as they are matters of common knowledge at the time and in the
community.3 Plaintiff in his petition to which the defendant demurred generally,
alleges that the wires had been in such a defective condition for such a length of
time that the defendant knew or by the exercise of reasonable care should have
known of all of said condition in time to have remedied them. It was also alleged
that the defendant knew or should have known that children flew kites on this lot,
and that on damp days the string which they used could act as a conductor. Know-

1.
2.
3.

107 S. W. (2d) 112 (Mo. App. 1937).
11 Q. B. D. 503 (1883).
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 290.
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ing this, he owed to the members of the plaintiff's class the duty of putting the wires
out of reach. "Negligent conduct may be ... a failure to do an act which is necessary for the protection or assistance of another and which the actor is under a duty
to do."' The actor, as a reasonable man, should know the peculiar habits, traits, and
tendencies which are known to be characteristic of certain well-defined classes of
human beings. 5 In Missouri, an electrical company "if reasonably chargeable with
knowledge, or of facts making it reasonably probable, that persons may lawfully
come into close proximity to its wires for purposes of either business or pleasure, is
obligated to use every precaution which was accessible to insulate its wires at
such places and to use the utmost care to keep them so."" Clearly in the light of the
law and the facts there was sufficient evidence to send the matter to the jury. Defendant could have foreseen that by leaving the wires hanging in a negligent manner some injury may result, so he was under a duty as to the condition of the
wires.
The second contention of the defendant is that the leaving of the wires in
the negligent condition was not the legal cause of the plaintiff's injury. The actor's
negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if his conduct is a substantial
factor in bringing about the harm to another.7 An important consideration in determining whether this negligent conduct of the defendant was a "substantial factor"
in producing the harm, is whether "after the event and looking back from the harm
to the actor's negligent conduct it appears highly extraordinary that it should have
brought about the harm."8 Considering the facts of which the defendant was
charged with knowledge, it does not appear "highly extraordinary" that, leaving
the wires uninsulated, one of the children that flew kites might have his string come
in contact with them and thereby be injured. If the result is a natural and
probable consequence of a negligent act, then that act is the legal or proximate
cause. 9 In the instant case the court held that after injury is complete, a person
charged with negligence may be held liable for anything which appears to have
been the natural and probable consequence of his act or omission. This is the test
commonly applied in other Missouri cases.' 0 And even if it were true that the light
company, at the time it left the wires hanging in a negligent manner, neither
realized, or even should have realized, that it might cause harm to the child in the
exact manner in which it occurred, it is not of itself sufficient to prevent them from

4. Id. at § 284.
5. Id. at § 290.
6. Godfrey v. Kansas City Light and Power Co., 299 Mo. 472, 253 S. W.
233 (1923).
7. RESTATEMENT, TORTs (1934) § 431.
8. Id. at § 433.
9. Sisk v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 67 S. W. (2d) 830 (Mo. App. 1934);
Nance v. Lansdell, 73 S. W. (2d) 346 (Mo. App. 1934); McWhorter v. Dahl
Chevrolet Co., 229 Mo. App. 1090, 88 S. W. (2d) 240 (1935).
10. MacDonald v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 219 Mo. 468, 118 S. W. 78 (1909);
Smith v. St. Joseph Ry., Light, Heat & Power Co., 310 Mo. 469, 276 S. W. 607
(1925); Helton v. Hawkins, 221 Mo. App. 93,290 S. W. 91 (1927).
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being liable for the plaintiff's injury if their conduct was negligent to the plaintiff
1
and was in all other particulars a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.
The third contention of the defendant is that the injury of the plaintiff was
caused by an intervening agency, meaning the kite string, and that this intervening
agency was such as to relieve the city from liability. If an act can be apprehended
or foreseen, it is not such an intervening agency as will cut off the defendant's
liability. 12 Even the act of a third person intervening and contributing a condition
necessary to the injurious effect of the original negligence will not excuse the first
wrongdoer, if such act could have been foreseen.' 3 In the main case it was thought
that the defendant could foresee that the string might come in contact with the
wires. The court said, "to overcome or destroy operation of antecedent negligence,
intervening cause must be one not ordinarily to have been anticipated in natural and
probable order of things, and must have been so unusual and so improbable as not
to have been reasonably foreseen or considered by ordinary prudent person."
The case presents for analysis the chief factors in any action based on negligence,
namely, the duty, causation and intervening cause. It does not seem that the
court went too far in the conclusions which it reached from the application of these
principles to the facts in the instant case.
CHARLES REHM
NEGLIGENCE-IMPUTING

HUSBAND'S NEGLIGENCE TO WIFE.

Silsby v. Hinchey'
While riding in an automobile driven by her husband, plaintiff was injured in
a collison with an automobile driven by the defendant. Plaintiff and her husband
were, at the time of the accident, on their way to attend a social function. In this
action to recover for personal injuries caused by his negligence, defendant contends
that there was contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff's husband and,
since she and her husband were engaged in a joint enterprise, that his contributory
negligence will be imputed to plaintiff so as to bar her recovery from the defendant.
In affirming a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the court of appeals failed to find
a joint enterprise and, in effect, said that where the wife is merely riding with the
husband in the automobile, and their purpose was to serve their mutual pleasures,
or to transact the affairs of the family, with no equal right to control shown, then
the trip is not to be considered a joint enterprise in the sense that the negligence
of the husband will be imputed to the wife.

11. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 435.
12. Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136 (1872); Bell Lumber Co. v. Bayfield Transfer Ry., 169 Wis. 357, 172 N. W. 955 (1919); Sisk v. Chicago, B. & Q.
R. R., 67 S. W. (2d) 830 (Mo. App. 1934).
13. State ex rel. Kearney v. Finn, 87 Mo. 310 (1885); Teasdale v. Beacon Oil
Co., 266 Mass. 25, 164 N. E. 612 (1929).
1. 107 S. W. (2d) 812 (Mo. App. 1937).
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This case presents the question of whether or not, when a wife is riding in
an automobile driven by her husband, the negligence of the husband, if any, will
be imputed to the wife so as to bar her recovery against some third person, whose
negligence concurred with that of her husband to bring about the collison in which
the wife suffered personal injuries. In Missouri it is well settled that, in such a case,
the negligence of the husband will not be imputed to the wife unless there is found
a relationship of joint enterprise or agency. 2 This is also the rule in other jurisdictions. 3

A relationship of joint enterprise is present when there is an equal right to
control and a common purpose.4 If this relationship is found, all jurisdictions hold
that the negligence of the husband can be imputed to the wife so as to bar her
recovery from a third person. 5 Whether or not the wife had an equal right to control depends, of course, on the facts of the particular case. Some one fact may be
very weighty evidence in showing a joint or equal right to control. The great
weight of authority holds the fact that the husband and wife were joint owners
of the car to be such evidence.6 Query, would it make any difference whether the
wife paid part of the purchase price, or the husband purchased the car and
merely had it put in their names jointly? There are a few jurisdictions contra. 7
In Rodgers v. Saxton," the wife was not merely a joint owner, but the sole owner
of the automobile. The court held that the negligence of a husband was not imputable to the wife under the circumstances, saying, in effect, that a joint or shared
control of an automobile in which a person is riding as a passenger does not necessarily arise from the passenger's marital relationship with the driver or from the

2. Crockett v. Kansas City Rys., 243 S. W. 902 (Mo. 1922); Longan v.
Kansas City Rys., 299 Mo. 561, 253 S. W. 758 (1923) (modified on other grounds in
314 Mo. 390, 284 S. W. 455 (1926); Ziegler v. United Rys., 220 S. W. 1016 (Mo.
App. 1920); Ross v. Wells, 212 Mo. App. 62, 253 S. W. 28 (1923).
3. Lake Erie &W. R. R. v. Howarth, 73 Ind. App. 454, 124 N. E. 687 (1919),
127 N. E. 804 (1920); Waring v. Dubuque Electric Co., 192 Iowa 1240, 186 N. W.
42 (1922); Denton v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 90 Kan. 51, 133 Pac. 558 (1913), second appeal, in 97 Kan. 498, 155 Pac. 812 (1916); Laird v. Barthelote, 63 Mont. 122,
206 Pac. 445 (1922); Stevens v. Luther, 105 Neb. 184, 180 N. W. 87 (1920). See collection of cases in (1929) 59 A. L. R. 153; (1937) 110 A. L. R. 1099.
4. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 491.
5. Pence v. Kansas City Laundry Service Co., 332 Mo. 930, 59 S. W. (2d)
633 (1933); Tannehill v. Kansas City, C. & S. Ry., 279 Mo. 158, 213 S. W. 818
(1919).
6. Archer v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. Rv., 255 N. W. 67 (Wis. 1934), 95
A. L. R. 851 (1935); Perrin v. Wells, 22 S. W. (2d) 863 (Mo. App. 1930).
7. See Southern Ry. v. Priester, 289 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923); In Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 120 Va. 655, 91 S. E. 632 (1917), the wife was
the owner of the automobile and was injured while her husband was driving. The
court held that the husband was a gratuitous bailee of the automobile and control
over it was absolute.
8. 305 Pa. 479, 158 Ad. 166 (1931). Where the owner of the car is riding in
it at the time of the accident, his presence is an important element in showing he had
control over its operation. See collection of cases in (1919) 2 A. L. R. 888; (1932)
80 A. L. R. 285.
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fact that the passenger is the car's owner. In this case the court reaches its decision
on the theory that the husband was the bailee of the automobile and the wife was
riding with him as a guest. While perhaps suitable to a particular set of facts, this
reasoning seems unsound when applied as a general rule. The fact that the wife
was the sole, or even a joint owner of the automobile indicates that she did have the
legal right to equal control, though perhaps it was not exercised, and any negligence
of the husband should be imputed to her. A showing of sole or joint ownership in
the wife should be prima facie evidence of an equal right to control in her.
Where there is no joint ownership, but merely the marital relationship, it is, of
course, necessary to find from the facts of the particular case whether or not the
wife had such control over the operation of the automobile as to make her husband's
negligence attributable to her. The weight of authority holds that where there
is nothing appearing other than the marital relationship, there is no ground for
imputing the husband's negligence to the wife. 9 But there are some jurisdictions
that consider the marital relationship alone to be sufficient to justify such imputation.' 0 This view is prevalent in states where the community property system is in
effect. In California, the courts hold that all damages recovered for personal
injury to the wife are community property, since they were not owned before
the marriage nor afterwards obtained by gift, devise, bequest or descent." Thus,
in order to prevent the husband from benefitting, the courts prohibit recovery by
the wife. This result could also be reached on the basis of the joint ownership of the
automobile which would necessarily exist.
The courts often refer to the wife, when she is riding with the husband, as a
mere guest or invitee having no voice in directing the movements of the automobile.
Practically all courts have refused to impute negligence from the driver of an
automobile to his guest. 12 The prevailing view is sound in theory, because there
seems to be no basis whatever for imputing negligence where there is no legal right to
control.

9. Thompson v. Sides, 176 N. E. 623 (Mass. 1931); Corn v. Kansas City,
C. C. & St. J. Ry., 228 S. W. 78 (Mo. 1921); Jepson v. Shaw Transfer Co., 211 Mo.
App. 366, 243 S. W. 370 (1922), cert. quashed, State ex rel. Shaw Transfer Co. v.

Trimble, 250 S. W. 396 (Mo. 1923); Ross v. Wells, 212 Mo. App. 62, 253 S. W. 28
(1923), cited note 2, supra; Betz v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 253 S. W. 1089 (Mo.
App. 1923), aff'd, 314 Mo. 390, 284 S. W. 455 (1926); Pettitt v. Kansas City, 267
S. W. 954 (Mo. App. 1924). See Gregory, Vicarious Responisibility and Contributory
Negligenwe (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 831.

10. Pacific Const. Co. v. Cochran, 29 Ariz. 554, 243 Pac. 405 (1926); Ostheller
v. Spokane & I. E. R. R., 107 Wash. 678, 182 Pac. 630 (1919). These cases are
based on the fact that the husband has an interest in the community property. Brady
v. Pere Marquette Ry., 248 Mich. 406, 227 N. W. 737 (1929).
11. Johnson v. Hendrick, 45 Cal. App. 317, 187 Pac. 782 (1919).
12. Treadway v. United Rys., 300 Mo. 156, 253 S. W. 1037 (1923); Simrell v.
Eschenbach, 303 Pa. 156, 154 Ati. 369 (1931). Michigan is contra. See note (1934)
32 MicH. L. R. 274, pointing out that Michigan imputes negligence to the ordinary
guest of an automobile driver. Michigan is the only state going this far.
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Of course, if it is found that the husband was acting as agent of the wife, his
negligence can always be imputed to her. However, "the agency of the husband
for the wife is not to be implied, inferred, or presumed from, or deemed to be created
13s
or established by, the marital relationship alone; there must be other proof."
It is essential to the existence of such a relationship that the wife shall have previously authorized the husband to act as her agent or subsequently, with knowledge
of his acts, ratified or adopted them.14
It is very likely that the reason the courts are generally so reluctant to impute
the negligence of the husband to the wife unless there is a clear showing of an equal
right to control, is that from time immemorial the husband has been considered
the head of the household and the courts realize that, while there should be in
theory, perhaps, an equal right to control the operation of the family car, it is a
rare occasion when the wife's efforts to direct the operation of the car will prevail.
DAVID

R. HARDY

WILLs-ADEMPTION OF BEQUEST OF INTEREST IN A BUSINESS BY CHANGE IN THE

BUSINESS STRucTuRE.

Hankey v. French'
Testator bequeathed to his wife all of his personal property, with the exception
of his interest in the partnership of R. T. French & Sons, which was bequeathed to
testator's two sons after a life interest in the widow of the use and income of the
testator's share. The testator expressly provided that his interest in the business
was not to be sold, but that the business was to be continued. When the will was
executed in 1927, the testator was a copartner with his father and brother in the
partnership of R. T. French & Sons, each owning an equal share. In 1930 the firm
was dissolved and testator's father retired from the business. Testator and his
brother then formed a new partnership known as R. S. & T. D. French, in which
2
each had an equal interest. No substantial change was ever made in the assets of
the business. Testator died in 1936. Reversing the decree of the lower court, it was
held that there was no ademption and that the testator's present partnership interest
passed to his sons, subject to a life interest in the widow.
The earlier view of ademption by extinction was that the intention of the
testator governed as to whether the legacy was adeemed. 3 Thus, if the property

13. In Rodgers v. Saxton, 305 Pa. 479, 158 Atl. 166 (1931), the court pointed
out that the relation of principal and agent does not exist between husband and
wife by virtue of the marital relation itself. See 30 C. J. 623; 13 R. C. L. 1168, 1178;
5 R. C. L. Penn. Supp. 3466, 3467.
14. 30 C. J. 620.
1. 275 N. W. 206 (Mich. 1937).
2. MIcH. CoMP. LAWS (1929) § 9866. Although the partnership assets consisted of both personalty and realty, it is considered to be personalty.
3. ATnGNSON ON WILLS (1937) 691; Beall v. Blake, 16 Ga. 119 (1854); White
v. Winchester, 23 Mass. 48 (1827). Contra: Humphreys v. Humphreys, 2 Cox Ch.
184 (Eng. 1789).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol3/iss1/15

26

et al.: Recent Cases

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
bequeathed was disposed of or destroyed during the lifetime of the testator, the
legatee would receive money or other property equivalent in value to the property
bequeathed, if the testator so intended. The intention of the testator has always
been vital in cases of ademption by satisfaction.4 But as to ademption by extinction, the rule generally followed today is that if the article bequeathed is not a part
of the testator's estate the legacy is adeemed, regardless of the intent of the
testator.5

There are two somewhat related matters which must be determined in cases
of this nature: First, what was the thing given by the will; and second, was there
such a substantial change in the thing given as would work an ademption. The
lower court treated this as a bequest of testator's share or interest in a certain,
specified partnership, that of R. T. French & Sons, which was in existence at the
time the will was executed, and that ademption resulted on the extinction of the
thing or fund given. There can be no quarrel with this decision if the lower court
was correct in determining what the object of the bequest was, for when the
testator died he had no share in the business named in the will which could be a
part of his estate. There was nothing upon which this part of the will could operate.
The appellate court reversed the decree, holding the object passed by the will was
the assets of the business, and as there was no substantial change in the assets, no
ademption resulted. 6
It is a cardinal rule in the construction of wills that the intention of the testator
is controlling, and if possible, must be ascertained and given effect3 While a will
is not operative until the death of the testator, it speaks his intention at the time
of its execution, but this may refer to the situation existing at the time of his death.'
Where the legacy can be construed as one of the proceeds of described property, and
the testator conveys the property in his lifetime, it has been held that if the proceeds
can be traced and identified in cash, or securities, the legacy is not adeemed.9 In
using the words "my interest" testator evidently intended to pass his share of the
assets of this family business, as he expressly provided that the business should be
carried on, for which purpose the assets would be necessary. In common business
understanding the words would ordinarily be broad enough to include the stock,
physical assets, and the like, and an ordinary business man would probably intend
such meaning in referring to his business. If the testator had disposed of his interest
4. Heileman v. Dakan, 211 Iowa 344, 233 N. W. 542 (1930).
5. Lang v. Vaughn, 137 Ga. 671, 74 S. E. 270 (1912); Succession of Canton,
144 La. 113, 80 So. 218 (1918); Moffatt v. Heon, 242 Mass. 201, 136 N. E. 123
(1922).
6. The facts do not show with what formalities the new partnership was
formed. Apparently the court is influenced somewhat by the fact that this was
a continuation of the family business, and that such partnership agreements are
rather loosely drawn.
7. Field v. Field, 297 Ill. 379, 130 N. E. 748 (1921); Carroll v. Herring, 180
N. C. 369, 104 S. E. 892 (1920).
8. Harris v. Harris, 97 N. J. Eq. 190, 127 Atl. 108 (1925); cf. McCormick v.
Hall, 337 Ill. 232 (1929).
9. Gist v. Craig, 142 S. C. 407, 141 S. E. 26 (1927); In re Black's Estate, 223
Pa. 382, 72 AtI. 631 (1909).
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in the partnership, no doubt this legacy would have been adeemed, but it would seem
a violent construction to say the legacy was adeemed because the testator's interest
had been increased through the retirement of his father and the formation of the
new partnership. 10 The testator intended to bequeath his share in the assets,
regardless of by what name the partnership was known, or whether his share of the
assets had been increased.
The application of the rule of ademption by extinction is easy when a specific
bequest of a particular object is made, and then the property is sold or substantially
changed in the lifetime of the testator. But there is also the rule that a slight
change in the form of the property bequeathed will not work an ademption.", The
question of whether a change is substantial or of form only is one of degree, and
slightly varying circumstances may lead to decisions that are apparently contradictory. In the principal case, the change was deemed to be in form only and did
not vary the disposition the testator had previously made.
A further question, not raised in the case, is whether the two sons, in taking
over the business must assume the liabilities of the business, or are the debts of the
business, for which the testator is personally liable, payable out of the residuum?
Cases involving an unincorporated individual business show a conflict on this
point.12 It would seem that the average testator would think of his business as an
entity including debts and credits, as well as physical assets. 13 This would lead to
the position that the legatee must assume the business debts. It would appear the
same reasoning should be applied to a legacy of the testator's interest in a partnership business. Indeed a testator might more readily consider a partnership
as a separate entity than his individual business. The fact that testator might
have realized there must be a separate administration of the partnership affairs 4
is perhaps an added reason for the application of this construction to a bequest of an
interest in a partnership.
HERBERT S. BROWN
WILLS-CONDITIONAL WILLS.

Watkins v. Watkins' Adm'ir
Certain heirs contested Watkins' will, claiming that it was contingent in character and that its effectiveness depended upon the death of the testator while he
10. Ini re Russell. Russell v. Chell, 19 Ch. D. 432 (1882).
11. Goode v. Reynolds, 208 Ky. 441, 271 S. W. 600 (1925); Oakes v. Oakes,
9 Hare's 666 (1852); cf. in re Horn's Estate, 317 Pa. 49, 175 Atl. 414 (1934).
12. Bank of Statesboro v. Simmons, 164 Ga. 885, 139 S. E. 661 (1927), holds
that the debts of an unincorporated business are payable out of the residuum.
Noted in (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 471. In re Lowe, 206 N. Y. 671, 99 N. E.
722 (1912), holds that the legatee must assume and pay the accounts payable of
the business.
13. In re Lowe, 206 N. Y. 671, 99 N. E. 722 (1912).
14. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 82; Loewenstein v. Loewenstein, 114 App. Div.
65, 99 N. Y. Supp. 730 (1st Dep't 1906); Schenk v. Lewis, 125 S. C. 228, 118 S. E.
631 (1923).
1. 106 S. W. (2d) 975 (Ky. App. 1937).
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was on a trip referred to in the will. The paper in controversy began with the following sentence: "In view of my trip to Kansas City, Missouri, for a short visit,
I am leaving this memo Will in case of my passing away for any reason." Then
followed provisions for establishing a trust fund in favor of the testator's wife after
payment of debts and stipulations relating to the disposition of the corpus on the
wife's death. The court in affirming probate of the will held that not only were the
circumstances, surroundings, and condition of the testator such as to make the will
a permanent one, but the strict letter of the instrument ". . so clearly bespeaks
permanency that we unhesitatingly conclude it was not intended to be conditional
or contingent."
The court followed the leading Kentucky case of Walker v. Hibbard2 quoting
therefrom

". .

. if the will is so phrased as to clearly show that it was intended

to take effect only upon the happening of the particular event set forth in the paper
as the reason for writing it; or, putting it in other words, if it was written only to
make provision against a death that might occur on account of or as a result of the
specific thing assigned as a reason for writing the will-it will be a contingent will;
but, if the causes assigned for writing it are merely a general statement of the reasons
or a narrative of conditions that induced the testator to make his will, it will not
be a contingent will, although it may set forth probable or anticipated dangers or
conditions that induced the testator to write it."
The question as to whether or not a will is conditional is one of construction
to be decided by the court. Parol evidence is not admissible to show that a will
absolute on its face was intended to be conditional.8 The court examines the contents of the instrument, and the surrounding circumstances to determine the intention of the testator.4 If a will is contingent upon the happening of some event and
that event is not fulfilled, the will is ineffective and not entitled to probate. 5 It is
often true that a future event mentioned may be only the inducement or a statement as to the reason for drawing the instrument at the particular time; this motive
may be so poorly expressed as to suggest the possibility that the effectiveness of the
will depends upon the occurrence of that event. 6 Some courts have held a will conditional and ineffective because the event has not taken place. Other courts have
treated almost identical language as a mere inducement for making the will and
so admit the will to probate.r
2. 185 Ky. 795, 215 S. W. 800 (1919), 11 A. L. R. 832 (1921).
3. Sewell v. Slingluff, 57 Md. 537 (1881). See Hampton v. Dill, 354 Ill. 415,
188 N. E. 419 (1933), where the court held that the testator's intent must be determined by the language of the will itself, and not from the surmise that he used
language to express the intention he had in mind which he failed to express.
4. Spratt' Goods, [1897] P. 28; Magee v. McNeil, 41 Miss. 17 (1866); Note
(1926) 36 YALE L. J. 887.
5. Tarver v. Tarver, 9 U. S. 174 (1835); Damon v. Damon, 8 Allen 192
(Mass. 1864); In re Poonarian's Will, 234 N. Y. 329, 137 N. E. 606 (1922); Note
(1923) 32 YALE L. J. 851; Note (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 403.
6. Eaton v. Brown, 193 U. S. 411 (1904).
7. It would be quite useless to cite cases where two courts have interpreted
the effect of practically similar phrases differently. See (1921) 11 A. L. R. 846.
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At first glance it appears that the decisions are irreconcilable. In some cases
this may very well be true. The better view is that the courts should hold such
language to be a mere inducement when that construction is possible.8 This position
enables the court in explaining the testator's intention to infer that he intended to
die testate rather than intestate. 9 The rule is an aid in the construction of wills and
not a presumption."0
There is a reason why the same or similar phrases may be construed in different ways by the courts: the decisions are not necessarily contra. Although the
finding depends primarily upon the testator's language as expressed in the written
instrument, the court puts itself in "the shoes of the testator."-" Conditions strongly influencing the judge's conclusion may not appear clearly in the reports. A
provision will not be implied from indefinite language.' 2- The judge will ask himself
such questions as-under what circumstances was the will made? Was the type
of disposition temporary or permanent? Did the testator treat the will upon his
return as though he intended it to be permanent or did he regard the paper as
worthless since the contingent event did not occur? 13
The Kentucky court followed the best rules of construction and interpreted
Watkins' will in a manner devoid of criticism. The solution of the Watkins case
was not very difficult because the instrument contained a phrase highly suggestive of
permanency: "in case of my passing away for any reason." The court maintains that
this phrase was general in its nature and "does not refer solely to death during or
as a possible result of the trip to Kansas City." Also the circumstances show that
"the matter of making a will had been discussed between Mr. and Mrs. Watkins,
since it was recited that she had consented for the estate to be left in trust for her.
They were childless and naturally the wife was the supreme object of testator's
affection and bounty, and to be preferred over collateral kindred."'' 4
Robnett v. Ashlock' 5 is the only Missouri case directly in point. Here the testator prefaced his will with the following words: "I this day start to Kentucky; I may

8. American Trust &Safe Deposit Co. v. Eckhardt, 331 111. 261, 162 N. E. 843
(1928); Eaton v. Brown, 193 U. S. 411 (1904); Ferguson v. Ferguson, 121 Tex.
119,45 S. W. (2d) 1096 (1931); McMerriman v. Schiel, 108 Ohio St. 334, 140 N. E.
600 (1923); Porter's Goods, L. R. 2 P. & D. 22, 18 W. R. 231 (1869); See ATKINSON
ON WILLS (1937) § 150.
9. Eaton v. Brown, 193 U. S. 411 (1904).
10. In Ferguson v. Ferguson, 288 S. W. 833 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926), the court
held that "all presumptions are indulged against the will being contingent" but
since the construction of the effect of words in a will is for the court, the word
epresumption" must be interpreted as an aid or policy of the court rather than as a
legal presumption.
11. French v. French, 14 W. Va. 458 (1877).
12. Cartwright v. Cartwright, 158 Ark. 278, 250 S. W. 11 (1923).
13. The determination as to whether the will is conditional or not depends
upon testator's intention at the time of making the will, but his treatment of the
paper after it is certain that the contingency will not occur, is evidence of this
intention. See Likefield v. Likefield, 82 Ky. 589 (1885).
14. Watkins v. Watkins' Adm'r., 106 S. W. (2d) 975 (Ky. App. 1937).
15. 49 Mo. 171 (1872).
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never get back. If it should be my misfortune, I give my property to my sisters'
children, etc." The court held that the words referred to imported a condition on
the fulfillment of which the will was to become inoperative, and that when the
testator returned alive from Kentucky the will was void. The court based its
decision upon the construction of the language used and particularly emphasized
the word "if." The fact that the testator kept the will among his papers for thirteen
years after it was made does not appear to this court to be evidence of an intention
to draw a permanent will. The court relied upon certain cases dealing with wills
using similar language, 16 but a mere comparison of phrases without express consideration of external circumstances is an inadequate treatment of this problem.
LIPMAN GOLDMAN FELD

16. The great number of citations in (1921) 11 A. L. R. 846 listing conditional
wills under such headings as death on a journey, death on a voyage, death in military
service, death from sickness or operation, death away from home, and death before
a particular time are of little help in view of the underlying reasons for the decisions.
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